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This paper examines the (in)compatibility between the diagnostic and therapeutic theories of complementary and alternative
medicine (CAM) and a science-based regulatory framework. Speciﬁcally, the paper investigates the nexus between statutory
legitimacy and scientiﬁc validation of health systems, with an examination of its impact on the development of complementary
and alternative therapies. The paper evaluates competing theories for validating CAM ranging from the RCT methodology
to anthropological perspectives and contends that while the RCT method might be beneﬁcial in the regulation of many
CAM therapies, yet dogmatic adherence to this paradigm as the exclusive method for legitimizing CAM will be adverse to
the independent development of many CAM therapies whose philosophies and mechanisms of action are not scientiﬁcally
interpretable. Drawing on history and research evidence to support this argument, the paper sues for a regulatory model that
is accommodative of diﬀerent evidential paradigms in support of a pluralistic healthcare system that balances the imperative of
quality assurance with the need to ensure access.
1.Evidence-BasedMedicineand
HealthcareRegulation
States increasingly exercise their power to regulate aﬀairs
under their territories and determine the thresholds of
societal expectations in accordance with the best available
evidence. In the healthcare domain, there is increasing
focus on evidence-based healthcare delivery, which involves
the utilization of the presumed rationality of science [1]
in healthcare management and professional regulation
[2]. State law’s espousal of science and the “circulation of
meaning between science and law” have been denoted as
central features of modernity [1]. Commentators suggest
that the state has legitimated decisions based on scientiﬁc
judgments; in these cases, “scientiﬁc judgments glide into
normative judgments” [1, 3]. There is little wonder that
many policy decisions are increasingly being founded on
scientiﬁc evidence, especially when the decision to be made
concerns clinical practice guidelines that focus on speciﬁc
individual treatments [2]. In the legitimization of new or
pre-existing health systems, this new standard narrative
has not been diﬀerent. In the regulation of the paradigm
known in Western communities as “Complementary and
Alternative Medicine”, state law must decide between
competing versions of reality—the scientiﬁc (generated by
a biomedically-based Randomized Clinical Trial) and the
clinical (generated through diverse nonbiomedical methods)
and reported by ardent health consumers.
Complementary and Alternative Medicine (“CAM”) is
an inconvenient reality in today’s medical practice. Its
gradual re-emergence and prevalence in biomedical and
scholarly discourse has generated controversies regarding
the issues of safety and cost eﬀectiveness, and the basis
for which the state should grant legitimacy to CAM. A
recurrent inquiry is whether CAM can be scientiﬁcally
validated. This implies that CAM must be amenable to
scientiﬁc patterns of evidence. Ironically, the lack of evidence
of safety and eﬃcacy for many CAM therapies has had little
impact on consumer patronage. However, in the discourse
on state regulation of CAM, some commentators argue that
regulation must be based on scientiﬁc evidence of safety
and eﬃcacy. This inquiry is not surprising since health-
care policymakers are increasingly interested in “developing
and implementing evidence-based decision making” [2].
Evidence-based Medicine (“EBM”) has been deﬁned as the
“conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best2 Evidence-Based Complementary and Alternative Medicine
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Figure 1: Hierarchy of scientiﬁc evidence.
evidence in making decisions about the care of individual
patients” [4]. It also denotes the integration of “individual
clinical expertise with the best available external clinical
evidence from systematic research” [4]. Within the EBM
paradigm,theSystematicReviewsofRandomizedControlled
Trials (“SRRCTs”) sits at the highest level of the hierarchy of
evidence for establishing the safety and eﬃcacy of healthcare
modalities [2]. Figure 1 below illustrates the other evidential
paradigms in descending order.
TheimportanceofapprovalthroughtheSSRCTsismani-
fest in its inﬂuence in judicial, economic, and policy-making
circles. For health professions to obtain recognition by the
dominant political, economic, and judicial structures, they
must demonstrate commitment to the public welfare and be
associated with or supported by science [5]. According to
Casey and Picherack, some conventional health professional
organizations and commentators have taken the position
that CAM practitioners should not be recognized by the
state in the form of self-regulation unless and until they
can demonstrate that their therapies or practice methods
are evidence based [6]. Thus, the concept of evidence-based
medicine looms largely at the centre of discrediting CAM,
and it is, therefore, fundamental in the barriers to the
recognition of this form of medicine [6].
2.The RCT andCAM
The RCT is specially designed to validate categories of med-
ical interventions that are observable and measurable. There
aredissentingopinionsontheroleoftheRCTindetermining
what interventions are eﬃcacious. Some arguments have
highlighted the structural incompatibility between the RCT,
which was designed for biomedical research, and CAM,
which primarily comprises therapeutic philosophies that
transcend the biomedical. Other arguments have simply
drawn attention to problems inherent in the RCT methodol-
ogyitself,whichrenderitalessthanperfectmethodology for
researching many therapies, whether biomedical or CAM. In
the former case, the argument is that the very nature of CAM
disqualiﬁes the RCT as a suitable research methodology.
CAM constitutes a broad range of holistic and inte-
grated etiologies of illness and healing that incorporate
“complex causal networks” and unconventional concepts
such as “bioenergetic homeostatis, repressed memories, and
spiritual disturbances” amongst others [7]. The practice of
CAM is based on “complex” and “personalized” [7] episodes
between practitioner and client, in which the treatment
regime is speciﬁcally tailored to suit the particular interests
of the client. These regimes can diﬀer considerably from one
clienttoanother,“bothinthesubstanceoftheircontentsand
intheirmethodsofapplication”[7].Thismayleadtovarying
individual responses, “possibly even for the same person,”
though at diﬀerent treatment episodes [7]. Furthermore,
in chronic disease and prevention cases, CAM is usually
administered over reasonably long periods [7], and this may
not ﬁt with the methods of conventional research.
Against this background, this paper evaluates com-
peting theories for the regulation of CAM—science-based
(statutory) regulation on the one hand, and multilayered
investigativemethods,whichincorporatethebestoftheRCT
with perspectives from other ﬁelds such as anthropology,
on the other. The paper speciﬁcally discusses anthropolog-
ical research methods for the assessment of CAM, which
highlight the philosophical side of CAM rather than the
pathophysiological. Adopting ethnography as an evidential
tool, anthropological research in CAM emphasizes qualita-
tive data collection techniques, focus group strategies, and
observation of patient-practitioner interactions. Notably, the
objective here is not to discard the utility of scientiﬁc regula-
tion, but to highlight its limits and support comprehensive
proposals through which the law can generate the needed
evidence to undergird the regulation of diﬀerent CAM
therapies, particularly those that are not easily amenable to
the RCT methodology.
As part of the discussion of the RCT methodology for
validating CAM, the paper summarily examines the histor-
ical evidence on the impact of a science-based regulatory
framework on the development of some statutorily regulated
CAM modalities, such as osteopathy and chiropractic. A
close examination of the mechanism of the RCT reveals
that the statutory or medical model of regulation, whichEvidence-Based Complementary and Alternative Medicine 3
fundamentally espouses science as the objective mode for
validating medical practice, will have a signiﬁcant impact
on the development and practice of CAM. The statutory
model necessarily involves the institutionalization of medical
practice standards, which do not often correlate with those
operableinthepracticeofCAM.Infact,atemporalexamina-
tionoflegalregulationrevealsthatCAMinterventionswhose
underlying mechanisms have a high probability of eﬃcacy
and are amenable to scientiﬁc enquiry have achieved state
recognition.
However, this recognition has often come with a price
tag.Thestatutoryrecognition ofosteopathy andchiropractic
in Britain mandated the rejection of the esoteric foundations
of these therapies. It also mandated the exclusion of the
nonspeciﬁc elements and philosophies that accompany the
practice of these therapeutic systems, which had hitherto
formed the basis of their popular acceptance in the origi-
nating communities. The RCT’s limitations in investigating
nonbiomedical and subjective experiences can lead to the
restructuring of nonbiomedical healthcare systems, which
w o u l dh a v ee v o l v e dt ob eu n i q u ea n dw e l l - d e ﬁ n e ds y s t e m s
that are intrinsically diﬀerent from biomedicine. The eﬀect
of an application of a methodology designed for a speciﬁc
kind of research on another entirely diﬀerent set of medical
enquiry can be the loss of key aspects of the latter system.
Indeed, the historical evidence as examined in this paper
shows that in many cases, the CAM therapy becomes a
substrate of biomedicine.
Based on this evidence, this paper contends that while
scientiﬁc validation is laudable and beneﬁcial, yet an
uncritical application of the RCT methodology to all CAM
interventions will be less than an optimal framework for
regulating CAM. The contentions in this paper are primarily
grounded on the dual impacts of the proscience evidence-
based regime on the development of CAM, as well as on
anthropological evidence and the histories of osteopathy,
acupuncture, homeopathy, and chiropractic in the UK. The
paper argues that given its limitations, dogmatic adherence
to the RCT as the exclusive methodology for legitimizing
CAM will have multiple impacts on the status of CAM.
While one of these will predictably be a beneﬁcial impact
in its emphasis on outcomes rather than explanations [8],
an outcome that will elevate CAM to the status of an
accepted healthcare option, this paper indicates that this
samebeneﬁtinterpretedinahistoricalcontextwillconstitute
a drawback for the development of some CAM modalities.
Beyond imposing a narrower scope of practice on CAM
practitioners and mandating the abandonment of several
distinctive notions that distinguish CAM from biomedicine,
the use of science as an exclusionary tool for therapies that
are not amenable to the RCT might result in the gradual
eﬀacingofCAManditsequationwithbiomedicine.Thiswill
hardly be in the best interest of consumers, especially those
who are attracted to CAM because of its holistic and patient-
centred approach to healthcare.
Therefore, the paper sues for a regulatory system that is
accommodative of diﬀerent evidential paradigms. It suggests
that the acceptable evidence must be that which takes into
account the unique nature of CAM and advocates for a
modiﬁed methodological framework, which acknowledges
the belief systems and values inherent in CAM as part of
the therapeutic process itself. However, it is noteworthy that
the arguments proﬀered in this paper do not neglect the fact
that studies have shown that about 30%−40% of physician
recommended services lack evidence of eﬀectiveness or have
very little compelling evidence to support the therapeutic
claims [9]. While acknowledging that many biomedical
services and products are yet to meet the threshold of the
EBM paradigm, this paper focuses on the impact of the
EBM paradigm on CAM because the medical and scholarly
communitiescontinuetoendorsethisparadigm,throughthe
RCT, as the optimal approach to validating CAM.
The analysis begins in Section 1 with a brief discussion
of the placebo eﬀect. In Section 2, the scientiﬁc evidential
paradigm is discussed with particular focus on the role of the
RCT in evaluating CAM practice. An evaluation of the RCT
necessarily implicates the Bayesian theory, a theory within
medical epidemiology and philosophy, which captures how
existing evidence interacts with (and may inﬂuence) emerg-
ing evidence to produce new outcomes. This theory is
examined to reveal its centrality to statutory regulation
of healthcare professions. Historical examples are drawn
from the early prohibition and regulation of osteopathy,
chiropractic, homeopathy, and acupuncture to establish the
nexus between the Bayesian theory and statutory regulation
of healthcare modalities. Section 3 examines anthropological
research methods for validating CAM, focusing on the
arguments of medical anthropologists who question the
objectivity of scientiﬁc forms of evidence through diﬀerently
constructed forms of evidence [10]. The concluding part of
the paper addresses the need for a validation process that
recognizes the inherent duality of approaches, methods, and
belief patterns between CAM and biomedicine.
3.CAM andthe Placebo
The increase in CAM patronage and of constitutional claims
to tax relief and reimbursement for CAM expenses has
inﬂuenced debates about cost eﬀectiveness, an index that has
emerged as a crucial determinant of which CAM modality
should obtain state funding. In the debate on the cost
eﬀectiveness of CAM, commentators have called upon CAM
practitioners to provide evidence of the superiority of their
therapiesovertheplacebo[11].Theterm“placebo”pervades
most discussions of the therapeutic eﬀects of CAM. In
fact, the subject of CAM appears inseparable from that
of the “Placebo Eﬀect” [12]. Although there is substantial
literature on the precise medical deﬁnition of the term [13,
14], yet there is signiﬁcant disagreement among physicians,
clinicians, psychiatrists, and philosophers of science on what
constitutes a placebo eﬀect [15]. It is usually agreed to be a
nonspeciﬁc substance, with no speciﬁc curative eﬀect, given
to satisfy the psychophysiological needs of a patient. As a
substance of operant conditioning, the placebo is also “used
on a control group in experimental design to further test
the eﬃcacy of an active substance or drug” [13, 14]. Placebo
Eﬀect (“PE”) has been deﬁned as “the bodily change due
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and not its pharmacologic or physiologic properties” [12].
This deﬁnition accommodates a PE achieved by other causes
outside the pharmacologic properties of the drug. Such a
broad deﬁnition of the PE creates room for some CAM
modalities such as mind-body healing and meditation [12].
While exponents of CAM may raise the question of
scientiﬁc eﬃcacy as a matter of genuine scientiﬁc curiosity
[12], some commentators devoted to this enquiry have
arguedthatCAMshouldnotbeexemptfromrigoroustesting
and should be examined using the same methods used to
test conventional therapies [16]. Brody, in a discussion of
the placebo eﬀect in the study and practice of CAM, asserts
that the chasm between CAM and biomedicine—insofar as
scientiﬁc eﬃcacy goes—may be much narrower than advo-
cates of biomedicine would like to believe [12]. Indeed, some
scholars contend that some complementary therapies are so
close to orthodox medicine that they can conveniently be
regulated along the same frameworks [17]. However, given
the esoteric nature of some CAM interventions, it has been
argued that the therapeutic approach of holistic therapies
must take into account the possibility of emotional and
psychological harm, which must be considered in the choice
of a regulatory scheme [17]. While notions of harm have
been heavily inﬂuenced by legal and biomedical rules [17],
legal regulation of CAM faces hurdles because the legal and
biomedical professions, much like the RCT methodology,
lack guidelines to exercise hegemony over notions of harm
“beyond the quantiﬁable, measurable notion of harm” [17].
It is noteworthy that CAM practice is common in degen-
erative medical conditions and those where behavioural,
emotional, or spiritual factors play a major role; in these
areas, the introduction of scientiﬁc logic into medicine has
not produced “noticeable improvements and (have) in fact
led to deterioration” [18]. Thus, in considering the RCT as a
research tool, the amenability of CAM therapies (especially
those that profess to heal the emotional facet of disease) to
the RCT needs to be factored into the choice of a research
methodology.
4.Evaluatingthe RCT
Federal regulatory agencies have the responsibility to deter-
mine the safety and eﬃcacy of medicines, nutritional
supplements, and herbal medicines. This function is critical
to the health and wellbeing of consumers who are unable
to assess the safety and quality of health products. Indeed,
the healthcare market is described as imperfect because
consumers lack the requisite tools to assess the goods on
sale since the exercise of their judgment is contingent on
f a c t o r ss u c ha st e s tr e s u l t s[ 19], quality assessment, and the
professional judgment sometimes required before purchase.
Thus, statutory regulation of CAM is not simply about
granting professional recognition to CAM practitioners; it
is ﬁrst about protecting consumers’ health and enabling
them to make informed choices. A further objective of
regulation is that CAM professionals will acquire the status
necessary to obtain funding/research grants and collaborate
with biomedical professionals to ensure the best healthcare
that would meet population needs, especially in rural and
underserved communities with a high rate of inequitable
healthcare delivery.
The recognition conferred by statute raises a speciﬁc
CAM modality to an accepted healthcare option [17]. The
passing of the Osteopaths Act in 1993 and the Chiropractors
Act in 1994 in the United Kingdom has been interpreted
as signiﬁcant landmarks. While many CAM therapies are
voluntarily self-regulated, the passing of similar Acts in
other countries has generated a lot of optimism that many
CAM therapies can achieve statutory recognition. However,
the process leading to the grant of statutory legitimacy
necessarily requires favourable evidence that the healthcare
intervention is eﬀective against the (range of) conditions for
which it is directed [7]. In order to establish this evidence,
the Randomized Clinical Trial, which is usually controlled
and double blind, is applied to the given data [20].
The Randomized Controlled Trial is a quantitative study
in which people are “allocated at random” to receive one of
several clinical interventions [20]. One of these interventions
is the standard of comparison or control, and it may be a
standard therapy or practice, a placebo, or no intervention
at all [21]. When evaluating the results of an RCT, the
methodological quality of the design, the conduct of the
trial, and the inﬂuence of pretrial beliefs are important
points to be considered. Hrobjartsson and Brorson argue
that these factors make it imperative to interpret RCT results
cautiously [21]. Indeed, where it is likely that a trial has
design inadequacies, or when the intervention is based on
theories that are not scientiﬁcally interpretable, the results of
the trial must be viewed with caution [21].
Before discussing the RCT in detail, it is important
to identify limitations to the eﬀectiveness of the RCT
in measuring the eﬃcacy of interventions in medical
science generally. One opinion is that the RCT is not an
unassailable methodology for testing CAM because the
trial will have to confront the same problems inherent in
testing orthodox interventions through RCTs [12]. Howard
Brody argues that as long as the placebo eﬀect remains a
signiﬁcant part of the results of biomedical trials, the RCT
will be an inadequate method for discountenancing CAM
[12]. Brody notes that since the RCT supposedly controls
for all “nondrug factors”, it assumes that other possible
causative factors are irrelevant to the medical scientist; as
a result, the “nonscientiﬁc” elements of CAM—the belief
and thoughts of the patient, the multifaceted etiologies of
disease causation and treatment that produce a placebonic
eﬀect—are excluded from the trial [12].
An important point in Brody’s argument is that the
placebo eﬀect remains present in RCTs of biomedical
interventions even though the trial is designed to consider
all nondrug factors as irrelevant. Beyond this, we must
note the variable factors that could inﬂuence the result of
a clinical trial. Results could be inﬂuenced by the eﬀect of
the interventions, inadequate methodological design, bias,
or chance [21]. The conduct of a trial by data or outcome
interpreters with a high interest in the results of the trial
may be a source of bias [21]. While genuine intent may be
an abstract term, it has been suggested that data or outcomeEvidence-Based Complementary and Alternative Medicine 5
interpreters will need to have such intent, untainted by
strong feelings for a special result from the trial [21].
Logistical challenges in RCTs are another problem.
Pharmacological standards require that a trial be conducted
according to the standards of good clinical (research) prac-
tice, and this very often refers to a process of auditing [21].
Systematic reviews of homeopathy trials where the method-
ological design was studied have revealed defective logistical
designs and a general low trial quality [21]. Hrobjartsson
and Brorson have observed that because quality analyses of
RCTs are often based on “analyses of trial reports and not
the conduct of the trial”, key aspects of trial methodology or
the problems involved may not be described. In one study
of a broad group of trials, with binary, objective outcomes,
it was observed that there was unconcealed allocation and
no double blinding, such that the participants were able to
predict the treatment they would receive before the start
of the trial [22]. As Greschner has noted, “the “evidence”
in evidence-based decision making can be collected or
interpreted in unfair or biased ways; if the evidence is biased,
so, too, will be the policy or guideline” [2].
Finally,HrobjartssonandBrorson,likeBrody,havenoted
that the RCT discounts the metaphysical in many CAM
modalities. While these elements arguably have no eﬀect
beyond the placebonic, yet they are important to any study
because the placebo itself has been described as medicinal
[23]. Indeed, “the phenomenon labelled “placebo eﬀect” in
RCTs is recognised as a powerful intrinsic component of
alternative healing” [10].
Toke Barfod’s concept of fragility sums up the above dis-
cussion[24].BarfodmakesadistinctionbetweenCAMinter-
ventions that are akin to biomedicine and those whose belief
systems diﬀerentiate CAM from conventional medicine.
While the former includes CAM therapies like herbal med-
ications that are considerably independent of the patient’s
belief system, the latter includes interventions that depend
on the faith or belief system of the patient and practitioner.
Barfod places CAM interventions along a spectrum with
these two divisions of CAM lying at the two ends of the spec-
trum. These divisions can be classiﬁed as the “context/belief-
independence” systems and the “context/belief-dependence”
systems [12, 24], with the latter being fragile therapies, and
theformer,nonfragile[12,24].TheargumentisthattheRCT
is an eﬀective way to validate therapies at the non-fragile
end of the spectrum. However, as the therapy progresses
towards the fragile end of the spectrum, the RCT fails to be
an eﬀective tool for assessment [12, 24]. The RCT creates an
environment foreign to the cultural and philosophical belief
context within which the fragile therapies would be most
eﬀective [12, 24]. This argument is akin to that proﬀered
by anthropologists and ethnographers, who contend that the
uniquenatureofCAMfavoursanevidentialparadigmthatis
cognizant of the eﬀect of philosophies, culture, and/or belief
systems on the eﬃcacy of the treatment [10].
A related issue to the above limitations of the RCT is
that of pretrial belief. A closer evaluation of pre-trial belief
in the RCT reveals its centrality to the results of a trial. In
this paper, pre-trial belief is analyzed to highlight its nexus
with statutory regulation of health systems. I employ the
BayesianTheory,aconceptwithinmedicalepidemiologyand
philosophy, to illustrate this nexus. Apart from rationalizing
the aﬃliation between scientiﬁc validation and statutory
regulation, the Bayesian Theory is also foundational to
advocating for diverse legal supervision of CAM beyond
regulation based solely on results of trials that strictly adhere
to the RCT model. However, before addressing the Bayesian
Theory,itispertinenttodiscusstheroleofpre-trialbelief(or
the null hypothesis) in RCTs and the limitations inherent in
its interpretation of the eﬃcacy of a therapy.
5.Testing CAM:The Null Hypothesisand
Its Limitations
The process of setting up and testing a hypothesis is funda-
mental to statistical inference [25]. In the process of setting
up a test, a theory is put forward “either because it is believed
tobetrueorbecauseitisusedasabasisforargument,buthas
not been proved” [25]. Thus, a null hypothesis “represents
a theory that has been put forward as a basis of argument,”
but that is yet to be proven [25]. An example is the claim
that a CAM modality is better than the conventional therapy
for the treatment of the same or similar symptoms. Special
consideration is given to the null hypothesis in a clinical
trial [25]. This is because “the null hypothesis relates to the
statement being tested, whereas the alternative hypothesis
relates to the statement to be accepted if or when the null
is rejected [25].” Therefore, the result of the test is usually
expressed in terms of the null hypothesis [25]. This implies
that the null hypothesis could be either “rejected in favour
of the alternative hypothesis”, or the conclusion may simply
be “do not reject null hypothesis” [25]. This is because a
conclusion that the null hypothesis should not be rejected
does not mean that the null hypothesis is true; rather, the
implication is that there is no suﬃcient evidence against the
null hypothesis in favour of the alternative [25]. According
to Easton and McColl, “rejecting the null hypothesis suggests
that the alternative hypothesis may be true” [25].
There are a number of limitations in the theory of the
null hypothesis. The most signiﬁcant for this study is that an
acceptance of the alternative hypothesis “only commits us to
ad i ﬀerence in observed parameters; it does not prove that
the theory or principles that predicted such a diﬀerence are
true, since it is always possible that the diﬀerence could be
due to additional factors not recognized by the theory” [26].
This point is signiﬁcant for CAM therapies that combine
multiple factors (many of which are not recognized by
the theory underlining the trial) as part of the healing
process. Put plainly, many CAM interventions are “complex
and multistranded” and may require a diverse range of
behavioural changes, such as life style or diet changes [10],
which are complementary to the primary CAM therapy
being administered to the patient. These complementary
strategies are not usually factored into the trial process, and
the impacts of such strategies are, therefore, not reﬂected in
trial outcomes.
An additional problem arises where there is strong belief
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This makes the null hypothesis the reverse of what the
experimenter actually believes; the implication is that the
null is put forward only to allow the data to contradict it
[26].Thisisusuallythecasewherethedatainterpreterhasno
genuine interest in achieving a positive result in the trial of a
CAM therapy. Other concerns relating to the null hypothesis
or pre-trial belief in the RCT are set out in the Bayesian
theory. The next section examines these concerns.
6. The BayesianTheory and
Statutory Regulation
Within medical epidemiology and philosophy, evidence is
evaluated within a continuum of already existing informa-
tion. Therefore, the interpretation of new evidence depends,
to some degree, on what is already known of the intervention
[21]. The existing information constitutes old evidence,
which interacts with the new to produce what becomes the
clinical result. This phenomenon is termed the “Bayesian
Perspective”. The framework of this theory is that “observers
evaluate new evidence in the light of their background
knowledge” [21]. In the process of evaluating new medical
evidence, there exists an estimated probability that a given
result will occur, and this is called the “prior probability”
[21]. The prior probability “cannot be neglected when
interpreting new evidence” [21]. At the other end of the
continuum is the “posterior probability”. The posterior
probability is evaluated on the basis of the prior probability
andthestrengthofthenewevidence.Whenpriorprobability
is low, a signiﬁcant amount of positive evidence is needed
to change posterior probability [21]. Thus, pre-trial beliefs,
coupled with the underlying theories in CAM, play a major
role in randomized controlled trials. Given this situation,
when the prior probability is based on an implausible
mechanism or is scientiﬁcally illogical, the prior probability
falls towards zero. Given the complex causal philosophies
of many CAM interventions, the tendency has been for
the prior probability of CAM to be estimated as very low,
such that the posterior probability in CAM trials hardly
changes [21]. Hrobjartsson and Brorson assert that this
makestheRCTanonneutral“algorithm”forascertainingthe
eﬀectiveness of a clinical intervention [21].
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the focus in a clinical
trial is on the existence or lack of therapeutic eﬀect of the
intervention and not the underlying mechanism [21]. In
other words, the hypothesis is not about “how” it works, but
“whether”itdoes.WillisandWhitehaveexplainedthatinthe
RCT, it is the outcome of an intervention that is important
and not the “underlying paradigm of disease causation
or treatment” [8]. However, it is signiﬁcant that in the
interpretation of a clinical trial, there is a close relationship
between the probability of the underlying mechanism of
action and the projected prior probability of the intervention
[21,27].Thisimpliesthatwhenthepostulatedmechanismof
action for an intervention is implausible or not scientiﬁcally
interpretable, the prior probability of the intervention to
have any observable clinical eﬀect falls [21]. When the
underlying mechanism is considered seriously defective, the
prior probability of the intervention to have “signiﬁcant”
and observable clinical eﬀects falls to zero [21]. If the prior
probability for an intervention is zero, such as the case of
homeopathy, a problem arises. According to Hrobjartsson
and Brorson, in such a case the interpretation of evidence
breaks down [21].
Interestingly, homeopathy is not statutorily regulated in
many countries. The homeopathic theory of disease has been
described as “absurd according to the standard scientiﬁc
position” [21], such that the trend has been to ascribe a
prior probability of zero to its hypothesis. The result is
that the clinical trial results of homeopathy are impossible
to read [21]. In contrast to homeopathy, while osteopathy,
acupuncture, and chiropractic are also based on theories
signiﬁcantly foreign to biomedical science, their theories
of disease have been accepted as postulations not entirely
absurd to Western science [21]. As earlier noted, these CAM
interventions have been granted statutory recognition in
some countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia.
Inthenextsubsections,Iexaminebrieﬂythehistoricalcharts
of these therapies, from preregulation to postregulation, and
highlight the compromises the systems have had to make in
order to obtain legal recognition.
6.1. Osteopathy and Chiropractic. A historical evaluation of
statutoryregulationofsome CAM therapies revealsa process
of reductionism from esotericism to medical exotericism.
Historytellsofhowmedicalantagonismtoosteopathyinten-
siﬁedinthe1920s[28].In1931,thepractitionerssoughtstate
recognition through registration, but the medical profession
opposed on the basis of “the lack of empirical evidence for
the existence of osteopathic lesions” [28] and the level of
training of the practitioners. In 1935, a statement signed by
800 medical and biomedical scientists was submitted to a
Select Committee of the House of Lords, denouncing the
lack of scientiﬁc evidence for the theoretical underpinnings
of osteopathy [28]. The British Medical Association laid
emphasis on the incompatibility between osteopathic and
“modern medical concepts of the nature of pathogens” [28].
However, with the approval of the medical profession,
the Osteopaths Act was passed in Parliament in 1993. It
provided for state registration but at a cost. The osteopathic
profession had to abandon its claims and agree to be deﬁned
“as a generic form of medicine” [28]. Having streamlined its
practicetoaframeworkacceptabletothemedicalprofession,
it progressed from being a threat to becoming a system of
healthcare that was supplemental to medical care in the area
of musculo-skeletal problems [28]. On this note, Cant and
Sharma have opined that “in Britain, the story was to be
acceptance with subordination rather than acceptance with
amalgamation” [28].
There are a number of similarities between the
Osteopaths Act and the Chiropractors Act of 1994 in the
United Kingdom. The details of both Acts are almost
identical, and both are modelled after the Medical Act of
1983 [17]. The Chiropractors Act originated after a working
party was set up to determine the feasibility of statutory
recognition of chiropractic [17]. A signiﬁcant reason for the
promulgation of the Act was the positive result of a Medical
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into the use of chiropractic care for the treatment of lower
back pain. The trial weighed the results of chiropractic
against conventional treatment [17].
When we analyze the statutory recognition of osteopathy
and chiropractic in the light of Barfod’s notion of fragility, it
is obvious that osteopathy and chiropractic are at the non-
fragile end of the spectrum. Whatever “nonmedical” factors
mayhaveplacedthemattheotherendofthecontinuumhave
been eliminated from their therapeutic theories so they can
ﬁt into a statutory regulatory framework.
6.2. Homeopathy and Acupuncture. Homeopathy came
under attack from the medical profession in the second
half of the nineteenth century [28]. It was argued that
the homeopathic theory of disease treatment was absurd
to medical theories. This led to attempts in the 1950s to
have homeopathic practitioners charged in the law courts
for the death of patients under their care [28]. Interestingly,
with the rise in the attack on their theory of practice,
homeopathic practitioners began to adopt more allopathic
techniques. Nicholls aptly captures this process as the
“bastardisation of homeopathy” [29]. According to Cant
and Sharma, “homeopathy as practiced by the doctors
trained in the Faculty of Homeopathy in London became a
tolerated if insigniﬁcant and marginalized group within the
broader medical profession, and when the National Health
Service was established in 1948, homeopathy was grudgingly
accorded a foothold within it” [28].
A similar process of metamorphosis can be seen in
acupuncture, a generic therapy which originated in China.
In the early nineteenth century, it was practiced by both
medicallyandnonmedicallyqualiﬁedpractitionersinBritain
[28]. While it was practiced in its original form with its
gamut of Chinese therapeutic/philosophical traditions in
China,thepracticeofacupuncturetobeacceptableinBritain
had to distance itself from some of its theories. According to
Cant and Sharma, “acupuncture as “naturalized” in Britain
was divested of its classical theoretical underpinnings in Chi-
nese diagnostics and understandings of the human person”
[28]. From the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century,
medical journals showed little interest in acupuncture and
denounced “nonmedically qualiﬁed acupuncturists” [28].
Fulder identiﬁes the attempt by medical acupuncturists to
interpret acupuncture’s eﬀect on pain in biomedical terms
and theories of the nervous system [30].
It is important to emphasize that the process of scientiﬁc
validation modiﬁed not only the theoretical underpinnings
of the intervention, but also the practice and range of condi-
tions to which it can be applied. Thus, “medical acupuncture
has been compartmentalized to the extent that it is used
for a restricted range of conditions” [28]. However, this
“very compartmentalization has served to distance doctor
acupuncturists from the growing body of nonmedically
qualiﬁed acupuncturists who practice acupuncture as a
more generic therapy and who regard themselves as more
faithful to the original Chinese therapeutic tradition” [28].
An important point that arises here is that nonmedical
practitioners continue to practice acupuncture, employing
methods adversative to biomedically accepted methods with
the knowledge that these methods, which are devoted to the
Chinese therapeutic tradition, are the primary attraction for
consumers. If consumers will continue to patronize CAM
whether or not accepted by biomedical science, then the law
must devise a way to protect them from whatever harm may
be inherent in the interventions. The next section examines
anthropological research methods, which investigates CAM
through a diﬀerent evidential paradigm.
7. Anthropological Evidence
Anthropological research methods diﬀer considerably from
the scientiﬁc. The focus of the research is neither pre-
determined nor tightly structured [10]. The methodology
employs an observer situated in the context of the phe-
nomenon under observation [10]. Anthropologists argue
that ethnographic research allows discovery of important
factors aﬀecting the results of a research, which are not
visible through scientiﬁc methods. Ethnographic research
looks primarily into the interaction between a particu-
lar patient and their speciﬁc healthcare provider [10].
According to Christine Barry, ethnographic research utilizes
“embodied” and “intersubjective data” [10]. Phenomena are
analyzed over long periods and ﬁeldwork stretches over
long timescales [10]. The anthropologist’s main tool for
investigation is himself or herself. Therefore, the collection,
evaluation, and interpretation of evidence are not through
randomization, standardization, or blinding techniques, but
throughpersonal,intuitivepatternsofknowledge.InanRCT
conductedonhomeopathy,WeatherlyJonesreportsthattrial
practitioners were of the view that the blinding “interfered
with their normal practice routines, to produce a radically
diﬀerent version of their normal therapeutic practice” [31].
In homeopathic training, a remedy to be active has to match
the total symptom picture to that of the patient. While
there can be a shared diagnosis of an ailment between
biomedicine and CAM, many biomedical prescriptions for
the same ailment will be “useless” and “inert” for the patient
in homeopathic theory [31].
Barry asserts that in the view of nonbiomedically trained
CAM practitioners, the evidence needed to validate CAM
is that which investigates not whether a therapy is working
according to biomedical/scientiﬁc criteria, but whether it is
making a diﬀerence to the bodies, beliefs, and social and
cultural experiences of its clients and whether patients keep
coming back [10]. Furthermore, she asserts that “anthro-
pological and other forms of evidence may prove to be
political tools to assist in this enterprise of transformation”
[10]. The anthropological perspective to CAM validation
aﬃrms the shortcomings of the RCT already highlighted
above. Anthropological forms of evidence also conﬁrm the
argument in this paper that policymakers need to employ a
varietyofevidentialparadigmstoregulateCAM.Speciﬁcally,
policymakers need to factor consumers’ values into the
decision-making process. This is particularly important
whenweconsiderthebeneﬁtsthatconsumersclaimtoderive
from using CAM. The anecdotes of eﬃcacy often form the
core reason for litigations over reimbursement for CAM
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However, it is important to note the limitations of
anthropological research methods. One of these limitations
is that it de-emphasizes the signiﬁcance of scientiﬁc val-
idation in “non-fragile” CAM interventions, such as in
the case of herbal medicines, which share a closer quality
with conventional medicines [10]. Clearly, ethnography
is not relevant for all CAM interventions. Therefore, a
superimposition of this evidential paradigm above all others
will fall to the same fallacy associated with the claim that the
RCTisthebestmethodforvalidatingamedicalintervention.
Finally, it is pertinent to highlight Willis and White’s
sociological analysis of the implications of the EBM theory
for the future development of CAM. According to the
authors, EBM will mandate the use of the RCT in validating
CAM, which itself will be ineﬀective for CAM interventions
lacking an acceptable evidential base [8]. Furthermore, CAM
therapies found to be eﬀective through the RCT may be
incorporated into biomedical practice, thereby losing their
“alternativeness” to biomedicine. Citing acupuncture and
chiropractic in the Australian context as examples, the
authors argue that there was serious attempt to restrict the
practice of these therapies to orthodox practitioners [8].
However, Willis and White conclude that EBM will
not play a decisive role in CAM regulation because the
history of health services reveals that “as a basis for politico-
legal legitimacy” clinical legitimacy (i.e., the continuous
patronage of a therapy by consumers willing to pay for
it) is more signiﬁcant than scientiﬁc legitimacy [8]. Using
chiropractic as an example, they assert that the reason for the
survival of the modality is not due to scientiﬁcally acceptable
evidence; rather, it is due to clinical legitimacy—the belief
of patients who experienced relief from it. Another example
may be found in the clinical eﬃcacy of psychoanalysis. The
acceptance of psychoanalysis has been based largely on its
clinicaleﬃcacyirrespectiveofthecontroversiesregardingthe
authenticity of its theories. The authors conclude that “social
processes external to the health system” would constitute the
primarypushfactorthatwouldinﬂuencethestatetoregulate
a given therapy [8]. Drawing examples from the registration
scheme for Traditional Chinese Medicine (“TCM”) and
natural therapies in Australia, they highlight the lack of
connection between the patchy results of RCTs conducted on
TCM and the passing of an Act to regulate TCM.
This analysis is signiﬁcant here in its identiﬁcation of
the inﬂuence of patient choice in health systems regulation.
The understanding is that there will be consumers whose
decisions to patronize a particular CAM modality may not
be aﬀected by the fact that the modality is unregulated.
This point is strengthened by the fact that CAM has been
interpreted as a manifestation of changes in medicine’s insti-
tutional authority initiated by a consumer-driven healthcare
environment [32] and by the (re)new(ed) patient interest
in having their values incorporated into healthcare decision
making, and healthcare delivery. If, as has been noted,
consumerprotectionisimperativeinanimperfecthealthcare
market, then it implies that states must devise a more
inclusive validation method for CAM that transcends the
limits of the RCT.
8. Conclusion: The Need for a Pluralistic
Evidential Paradigm
The foregoing discussion has focused on highlighting the
limitations and strengths of diﬀerent evidential paradigms
for regulating CAM. It has been noted that the RCT, while
beneﬁcial in its approach to medical research, is not itself
designed to provide optimal outcomes in researches that
combine subjective feelings and experiences with the pure
medical eﬀe c to fat h e r a p y .A ss o m es c h o l a r sh a v en o t e d ,
“science is structured to remove any human factors from
the context of the study, setting up a model that is detached
from feelings, meaning and subjective experiences” [33].
Since research methodologies “are not considered to be
independentfromtheirparadigmofreference”,itcanbesaid,
therefore,that“themethodsused...forconventionalmedical
research reﬂect the paradigm on which they were founded”
[7].
Other scholars have noted that the adoption of a single
evidential paradigm for CAM is less than optimal. Lewith et
al. assert that “no single research methodology in itself yields
all the knowledge necessary with respect to eﬀectiveness,
eﬃcacy, safety, and patient/doctor treatment preferences”
[34]. Vickers aﬃrms that the RCT indeed “does not aim to”
providetheanswerto“allquestionsofinterestinhealthcare”
[35]. These views have prompted some scholars to demand
for multiple research methodologies. Wayne B. Jonas voices
the following concern.
Is it possible to develop a pluralistic approach to
research methods that retains the value of West-
ern science for medicine and yet respects the
diversity of radically diﬀerent concepts about
life, health, and service [36]?
This paper contends that such an approach is possible
and should be pursued. The evidence collated in the fore-
going discussion favours a research paradigm that recognizes
the structural limits of the RCT in the context of evaluating
nonbiomedical therapeutic systems. This approach takes
the very weaknesses of the RCT as a starting point for
the investigation of CAM. This paper advances such a
modiﬁed framework, which acknowledges and integrates
the belief systems and values inherent in CAM as part
of the therapeutic process itself. These beliefs and values
have historically been denigrated as “placebo”, a term which
implicitly reaﬃrms popular conceptions about CAM within
Western biomedicine. A randomized clinical process that is
(re)designed to integrate the CAM paradigm, a paradigm
that seeks its therapeutic strengths from within and without
the medical eﬀects of the therapy itself, ensures the transfer
of knowledge between medical systems.
As reiterated in the foregoing discussion, science sits at
the root of the eﬃcacy, safety, and regulation debate on
CAM. Historically, state law has been known to espouse the
dictates of science, and science, bolstered by the force of
law, has been deployed as a tool of exclusion of nonwestern
medical norms. With the increasing utilization of CAM by
a signiﬁcant proportion of society, it is time for states toEvidence-Based Complementary and Alternative Medicine 9
embrace factors and paradigms beyond the reductionistic
framework of Western science or the RCT in the making
of policies. This argument is made in the hope that the
evidence-based paradigm will be reconceptualized to accept
not only the evidence from systematic reviews of RCTs,
but also that from studies which incorporate nonreducible
sociocultural belief patterns, which themselves are crucial to
the therapeutic process.
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